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Wissenschaftliche Bewertung von DRM-Systemen
Scientific evaluation of DRM systems
a Adversary model




What is the scope of the attacker?
a More general: What are the security demands?
⌦ confidentiality of content
⌦ integrity of content
⌦ availability of content
a Confidentiality:
⌦ protection against piracy
copy one content
copy every content in a certain time frame
break the entire system (copy every message at every time)
a Integrity:
⌦ authorized access to content
⌦ protection of ownership of content
a Availability:
⌦ prevention of denial of service attacks
Adversary model





a insider or outsider
⌦ concerning organizational aspects
(secrecy of master encryption keys)
⌦ concerning design secrets
 (e.g. of protection functionality in hard- and software)
a Who wants to attack a system?
⌦ Hobbyist (naïve attacker, no financial efforts)
⌦ Serious attacker (intelligent, probably no financial efforts)
⌦ Professional attacker (intelligent, financial motivation)
The existence of specialized tools shifts
the “knowledge” to anybody
Strength of existing systems
a Very limited protection
⌦ Most systems
protect against hobbyists
⌦ DRM systems realized in software
no or nearly no protection against serious attacks
⌦ DRM systems realized in hardware
weak protection against serious attacks
a In the best case:
⌦ Technical components of DRM systems consist of special adapted
and well-known IT security functions
a Worst case:
⌦ Content contains proprietary DRM signals or functions without
any special protection
Tendencies
a Pirates try to “reverse engineer” DRM systems
⌦ make them useable on other platforms (Linux, …)
⌦ make them independent of a certain hardware and software
seller
a Pirates in the Internet shift their “activities” to services
⌦ peer-to-peer services
⌦ anonymous communication services
a Pirates may use Trojan Horses to get content illegally
⌦ This is a very subtle and serious thread!
a Attackers make their knowledge public as automated tools
⌦ Hobbyists can now do professional attacks
copy 
protection
a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
a Special designed DRM technologies
⌦ Fingerprinting
⌦ Watermarking
a Naïve security mechanisms
⌦ Regional coding of content
⌦ Filter mechanisms
⌦ Incompatible formats and media









Content Provider Attacker Domain
Design Options for Copy Protection







Content Provider Attacker Domain
Make distributed signal difficult to use or copy
• timing signals in transmitted signal
• „copy resistant“ media
Design Options for Copy Protection
a Protect pay-services from unauthorized access
Digital































Useful for watermarking and fingerprinting

















Useful for watermarking and fingerprinting














Not: Protection against illegal copying
But: Detection of copies
a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
a Special designed DRM technologies
⌦ Fingerprinting
⌦ Watermarking
a Naïve security mechanisms
⌦ Regional coding of content
⌦ Filter mechanisms
⌦ Incompatible formats and media




















⌦ encrypted stream to all users
a individual decryption key
⌦ contains a fingerprint of the user
⌦ ID number / registration necessary
a Traitor tracing:
⌦ if illegal copy is detected the legal
customer can be traced back
a Only secure if both encrypted and







> LoFi Broadcast, HiFi Encryption
broadcastfilter
cryptkey 1 Client 1
cryptkey 2 Client 2
cryptkey 3 Client 3
.
.
.a Divide stream into quality layers
⌦ Everybody gets the low quality layer
⌦ Paying customers get encrypted layers
a MP3:
⌦ division of mp3 stream into quality layers
a costs are linear in the number of users
∆: delta
a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
a Special designed DRM technologies
⌦ Fingerprinting
⌦ Watermarking
a Naïve security mechanisms
⌦ Regional coding of content
⌦ Filter mechanisms
⌦ Incompatible formats and media





















⌦ Goal: Protection of authorship
⌦ Not: Protection against illegal copying












a Scope: Protect authorship of digital content
a correlation necessary
























a Praxis: (attacks by M. Kuhn, F. Petitcolas, 1997)
⌦ StirMark
  Software
  removes watermarks
  watermark is no longer detectable
  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fapp2/watermarking/stirmark/
⌦ Mosaic Attack
divides web images into a mosaic of tabular cells
browser reconstructs the view of the image
Stirmark Attack
a non-linear transformation of a picture
a synchronization gets lost
a no anchor for detector to find the position of embedded signal
Mosaic Attack
a divides web images into a mosaic of tabular cells
a uses html statements
a browser reconstructs the view of the image





a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
a Special designed DRM technologies
⌦ Fingerprinting
⌦ Watermarking
a Naïve security mechanisms
⌦ Regional coding of content
⌦ Filter mechanisms
⌦ Incompatible formats and media
⌦ DRM codes without any protections against removing
⌦ …
DRM Technologies















copy in bad 
quality only
Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a copy protection in videos recorders
DVD player analogue video signal
contains “DRM” signal
video recorder
copy in bad 
quality only
Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a copy protection in videos recorders







Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a DRM codes without any protections against removing
digital audio player digital audio
digital recorder
MD, CD-R (Audio), DAT
010010101110101110101010011100110010
Copy: content




Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a DRM codes without any protections against removing
Original 010010101110101110101010011100110010
Copy 010011101111101111101011011101110011
digital audio player digital audio
digital recorder
MD, CD-R (Audio), DAT
Copy 010011101111
Reset copy bit to make copies
010010101110 !
Naïve security mechanisms – examples








Naïve security mechanisms – examples

































a Secure DRM systems connect a DRM signal with the content to
protect in a way that the content signal is useless without the DRM
signal.
a Options:
⌦ DRM signal is part of the content signal (e.g. in watermarking
systems)
⌦ DRM signal is necessary to access/decrypt the encrypted content
signal
a Important point:
⌦ Detection of DRM signal cannot be bypassed




⌦ breaking is a matter of time and money
